The 2010-2011 Arsenal 4-2-3-1
New year and new season – it’s time to once again try and analyse the real Arsenal tactic, and figure out how to implement it into Football Manager so it:
1. Looks like the real deal in the 3D match engine
2. Gives us similar match stats in comparison to real statistics
3. Provides us with results and individual performances that match reality
This is done by comparing real life match analysis with the in game match analysis tool, tweaking every position until they correspond to each other. When they match, we start comparing the 3D match engine with real life videos of games played, to see if it looks convincing. Lastly, we play longer saves to see how players performances and ratings stack up. If they perform too different to reality, we either alter their positions/individual instructions slightly, or we alter them in the database.
The goal is to create the most realistic Arsenal experience in Football Manager 2011 possible, and this article is the first in a series of Arsenal-centric puzzle pieces that will eventually form the massive Arsenal Simulation Compendium – the most in-depth simulation guide for playing a realistic Arsenal save in Football Manager.
Continually Updated
This article will be updated every 10 Premier League games, so that we always have the latest averages to work with. Players and tactics evolve during the span of a season, so the Real Arsenal 4-2-3-1 tactic will also change over time to reflect these changes.
Differences From Last Year’s 4-3-3
At the beginning of last season, Arsene Wenger moved away from his trusted 4-4-2 he’d been using and tweaking since the late 90′s. This was a tactic that had won him two doubles, and had allowed his team to go unbeaten for 49 domestic games and coming within 20 minutes of winning the club’s first ever Champions League trophy. The most important key to the success of Wenger’s 4-4-2 was the wide forward positions that allowed wingers to cut inside and play as high (or, at times, higher) up the pitch than the two central forwards. Players like Overmars, Ljungberg and Pires thrived in these positions.
After the 2008/2009 season, Wenger decided to try something new. One reason was to finally conquer Europe, where Wenger tried a more exotic 4-5-1 to adapt more to continental tactics. Another reason was to create more freedom for Cesc Fabregas, letting him roam more without compromising on the numbers in midfield.
He took the best elements from the trusted 4-4-2 -> positional fluidity, inside cutting wide forwards, highly attacking full backs and a clever possession-based short passing approach, and created a 4-3-3 that worked quite well at first. The players definitely enjoyed it more, as it allowed them greater creative freedom and more passing options.
This first version of the 4-3-3 had a fairly flat midfield, with Song as the only defensive-minded midfielder in the middle, while Cesc and Diaby where attacking midfielders. Cesc started out in the right MC slot and was the most attack-minded. Diaby started out in the left MC slot and was the link between Song and Cesc – creating a skewed midfield.
This tactic had a couple of problems, especially defensive ones. The defensive line pushed very high up, due to the full backs replacing wingers on the flanks when they cut inside, and also due to our defenders not being physically blessed enough to fully control opposition players further down the pitch. Instead, they tried pressing high to reduce any threats early on.
You can view the analysis of last years 4-3-3 here.
This year, Wenger has tweaked his 4-3-3 into a 4-2-3-1, and it now features a couple of key differences to the previous tactic:
1. The midfield is now a 2-1 instead of a 1-2. Instead of having Song centrally as the only holding midfielder, Wenger has essentially skewed the midfield even more, finally turning Cesc into a proper AMC.
2. Defensive line has been pushed down, as Arsenal now have defenders better equipped to battle in the air closer to goal.
These changes (and some good signings for once) makes this years Arsenal formation a little bit more rigid, and as a result; better defensively.
Match Analysis Comparisons
So here is the first step; making sure the players move and behave like in reality, and the best way to do this is by comparing real match analytics with the in-game ones.
New for this season is that instead of showing you three example games for each player, I’ve combined the first ten Premier League games of the season and superimposed each and every position so you have a good overview of how they move over a prolonged period. I’ve also included both passing arrows and heatmaps that shows activity percentage.
Update January 2011
Chalkboards and statistics are now reflecting all 20 Premier League matches Arsenal has played at the time when this article was updated. To see comparisons between the first and the last 10 games, see the ‘Halfway Season Update!’ section further down the page.
Also, in case you were adding the numbers together and noticing that they don’t all add up to 100% – I have purposely left out any values below 2.5%, as it’s easier to get an overview of the player movements, and to eliminate clutter.
Hover over the images to switch between arrows/percentage.
Gael Clichy & Bacary Sagna (WBL & WBR)
True wing backs, covering the whole span of the flanks. Defending, attacking, assisting, crossing…the wing backs have a key role in the Arsenal 4-2-3-1.
Key Facts:
• Clichy spends 37.5% passing in the opponents half, Sagna 52.3%.
• Sagna passes (crosses) almost twice as much in the top zone than Clichy.
• Sagna covers the whole length of the pitch, Clichy plays slightly wider.
Passing Stats:
• Clichy – 59.1 average passes per game, 81% completion rate.
• Sagna – 63.9 average passes per game, 83% completion rate.
The biggest difference between the two is that Sagna gets further up the field. In the first 10 games of the season, this seemed to be because of Walcott cutting inside and opening up space for Sagna to move forward, but in match 11-20 Arshavin and Walcott have inverted their roles. This changes nothing for Clichy and Sagna though, so the reason for Sagna moving further up the pitch is probably not a tactical reason – Sagna is just more attack-minded han Clichy.
Substitutes: Kieran Gibbs is pushing Clichy for a first team place, and is the definite option if Clichy is out. If Sagna is unavailable, Eboué usually plays here, as there aren’t any other natural replacements for the DR slot. Havard Nordtveit has been playing the DR slot in the U18 team, so in the worst injury crisis he could be used there.
Thomas Vermaelen & Laurent Koscielny (DLC & DRC)
No matter who is playing in central defence, there is a small difference between the DLC and the DRC positions. The DLC position is the more advanced one, pushing forward and trying to press higher up, while the DRC position is covering behind him. Normally this behaviour would be controlled by the type of player in the position, but as evidenced by the chalkboards (they take both Vermaelen, Djorou and Koscielny into account for the DLC slot), it’s purely position based.
Key Facts:
• DRC spends about double the amount of time in the wing back slot than the DLC.
• DLC plays narrower.
Passing Stats:
• Vermaelen – 28.3 average passes per game, 99% completion rate.
• Squillaci – 37.2 average passes per game, 90% completion rate.
• Koscielny – 32.6 average passes per game, 89% completion rate.
• Djorou – 34.7 average passes per game, 92% completion rate.
When the wing backs push up, the central defenders stretch wide to cover both the DC and DL/R positions. Squillaci (DRC) is spending more than 20% in Sagna’s defensive space (DR/WBR), and Vermaelen/Koscielny (DLC) is spending around 10% in Clichy’s defensive space (DL/WBL).
The DRC position is better suited for slower and taller players (Koscielny, Squillaci), while the DLC position is better for short, quick and more creative players (Vermaelen being the only one in the squad fitting this description at the moment).
Substitutes: If Vermaelen is unavailable, Koscielny takes his place, and Squillaci takes the DRC position. So far, Squillaci has always played in the DRC position. Mobile and creative defenders go in the DLC slot, while solid defenders go in the DRC slot. Players are preferred in the following order: Vermaelen, Koscielny, Squillaci, Djorou and lastly Song if there are no other alternatives available.
Jack Wilshere & Alex Song (MLC & MRC)
Wilshere and Song are regarded as first choice in the MC slots. Diaby is still highly regarded by Wenger, and Denilson has been getting some action lately.
Key Facts:
• In the first 10 matches, Wilshere was more advanced, Song pulled back.
• In the latest 10 matches, they have switched roles, and Song is now more advanced.
Passing Stats:
• Song – 57.4 average passes per game, 87% completion rate.
• Wilshere – 43.3 average passes per game, 88% completion rate.
• Denilson – 76.0 average passes per game, 92% completion rate.
• Diaby – 37.5 average passes per game, 92% completion rate.
Song is still regarded as the defensive anchor, even though he has travelled higher up the pitch all season, and now finds himself more advanced than Wilshere. These two positions do swap around a lot with each other, filling in when needed. More about this in the ‘Connections to Total Football’ section below.
Substitutes: There are three players currently competing for the MLC slot – Wilshere, Diaby and Denilson – and they seem to be preferred in that order at the moment. In the MRC slot, the only “natural” replacement for Song is Denilson, but he’s not a defensive midfielder. In pre-season, Emmanuel Frimpong really showed some class, and was regarded as the backup for Song before he tore his cruciate ligaments in mid-August.
Andrey Arshavin & Theo Walcott / Samir Nasri (AML & AMR)
As previously mentioned, Walcott covers more ground, due to his tenacious nature. When Nasri plays the AMR slot, he gets more passes, and behaves more like Arshavin on the left flank. In these chalkboards you can clearly see how the wide forward positions work – the wide forwards start from an AML/R position, but moves up and cut inside to become central forwards. This behaviour is also tactically encouraged by having a “false 9″ – a central striker that drops down to a FC position to draw central defenders from their positions.
Key Facts:
• As corners are counted as passes, Arshavin’s stats in the top left zone are misleading.
• Almost 1/3 of Arshavin’s passes come from an AML/AMLC position.
• Overall, both flanks have very similar distribution, Arshavin cutting inside and playing wider.
Passing Stats:
• Arshavin – 37.0 average passes per game, 72% completion rate.
• Nasri – 53.6 average passes per game, 81% completion rate.
• Walcott – 19.2 average passes per game, 72% completion rate.
• Rosicky – 49.2 average passes per game, 87% completion rate.
In FM terms, the players usually operate somewhere between the AML/R and AMLC/RC positions, but push forward and generally play as high (or higher) up as the FC.
Also worth noting is that both Walcott and Nasri are seeking a more central position this year. They’re moving into channels and often end up in a FC position, forcing the actual FC to replace them on the right flank. We mimic this behaviour through the swap instruction. Once again there is more info about this in the ‘Connections to Total Football’ section below.
Substitutes: Both Nasri and Walcott are most comfortable in the AMR slot, but Nasri has been played in the AML slot lately. Nasri, Arshavin and Walcott all compete for the AMR/L positions.
Cesc Fabregas & Robin Van Persie / Marouane Chamakh (AMC & FC)
This year, Cesc has been moved from a MRC position to an AMC position, probably because he had such an impact at the end of last season when he started playing in a more advanced role. The AMC position enables him to roam around, and as you can see in the chalkboard, he is the player with the widest cover of the field, playing everywhere from DMC to AMR to AML to AMC.
Key Facts:
• Fabregas covers the whole width of the pitch, in both the AMC and MC line.
• Both Fabregas and the FC have very similar distribution patterns in the AMC line.
Passing Stats:
• Cesc – 64.3 average passes per game, 79% completion rate.
• Chamakh – 26.4 average passes per game, 81% completion rate.
• Nasri – 53.6 average passes per game, 81% completion rate.
• Diaby – 37.5 average passes per game, 92% completion rate.
• Van Persie – 43.5 average passes per game, 71% completion rate.
Cesc just has a 100% free role, and the key to making this work is that other players in the team replace his position if he moves into theirs. That’s why Song and Wilshere often end up close to goal – it’s usually because Cesc has come deep to get the ball, so either Song or Wilshere has replaced Cesc in the AMC slot to keep the structure of the formation intact. Once again an attribute of total football.
Robin Van Persie and Marouane Chamakh are similar in their movements, but Van Persie behaves more like an AMC in his movements. The FC position is so important for Wenger’s tactic to work, as the false 9 role is designed to allow for the wide forwards to push up and offer attacking options at the same level as the FC.
In essence, the AMC and FC play fairly level in terms of position on the pitch, forming what could be perceived as an attacking bank of four in a 4-2-4.
Another interesting thing to note is how the FC position follows the same pattern as the wide forwards – on the left side the position is more withdrawn and on the right side it’s more advanced. A clear indication that the FC covers for the AML/R positions when they cut inside.
Substitutes: Preferred substitute for Cesc is Diaby, Rosicky or Aaron Ramsey. In the FC slot, Chamakh replaces Van Persie, but if both of them are out, the best bet to fill this slot would be Bendtner.
Formation
Now that we have all the individual positions analysed, the Arsenal tactic can be described as many things. It can easily be a 4-5-1, 4-2-4, 4-2-3-1, 4-2-1-3, or even some more exotic shapes like 2-4-1-3 or 3-3-1-3. But if we just take the raw data and position the players in their average positions, the formation looks like this:
It’s a tie between a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-2-1-3, but for simplicity’s sake we’ll just call it a 4-2-3-1. The right flank is the more advanced, and the left flank is more compact.
Core Of The Formation
When trying to emulate a real life tactic, I usually try to figure out the core of a formation to better understand it. The “core” are the players who makes the most passes in the game. Most football teams today are broadly divided into two groups – the distributors and the receivers – and it’s usually balanced evenly (5-5).
To figure out the core, we take a look at where the most frequent passes are made, and from which positions. This is important for two reasons, and by figuring out where most of the passes come from, we can:
1. Draw conclusions on what player instructions and preferred moves we need to apply.
2. Better understand how the tactic works. Example: if most passes come from the wide forwards, we know that in FM terms, we need to set the passing instruction to “Down Both Flanks” in order to have the wingers more active.
In the Arsenal 4-2-3-1, most passes come from Clichy, Sagna, Song, Wilshere and Cesc, and if we take a look at it like this…
…we see that at the core, Arsenal are distributing passes from a fairly flat midfield five, sacrificing some defensive stability by pushing the full backs up to form a 2-4-1-3 at times. The reasoning behind it is to have the benefits of a 5-man midfield – being able to outnumber the opposition in midfield increases your possession…but also have the benefits of a 3-man forward line – creating triangles and balancing the numbers in attack vs defence.
The way it works is that by distributing passes from a width of a 5-man midfield, Arsenal are able to bring versatility to their passing. The full backs offer more direct passing and one-two’s on the flanks, and the midfield can switch play from flank to flank and serve through balls for the front three.
For comparison purposes, we can take a look what the core of Manchester City looks like:
A completely different approach. Arsenal are trying to distribute the bulk of their passes through width, while Man City are trying to distribute their passes from a defensive center. More about the Man City tactic in another article, coming soon.
Possession Much?
Another thing we have to do in order to re-create Arsenal’s style of play in FM is to figure out how and why Arsenal have so much ball possession. There are a couple of reasons:
1. Positional awareness – making yourself available for a pass. According to Wenger himself, a player should always have at least three clear passing options, at all times. The result is that Arsenal can keep possession for a long time (on a good day), since there is always an option to pass. Keyword being triangles.
2. Probing play – patience is key. Contrary to popular belief, Arsenal plays a short passing game, with some players allowed to be more direct if they think it’s necessary. They’d rather keep possession than take a gamble.
If we draw lines between every players short pass options, we get a whole lot of triangles:
By creating lines like this, we can see why the core have the most passes = they have the most options available, both to receive and distribute. The midfield trio all have at least 5-6 short passing options at any given time, and that makes it easier for them to distribute passes. It also allows them to move more freely, since even if one midfielder is out of position, the other midfielders have at least 4-5 clear options.
Real life passing stats: On average, Arsenal has 57.6% possession, 80.6% pass completion and 581 passes per game. We won't get that amount of passes per game in FM2011, due to it counting passes slightly different than the Guardian Chalkboards, but with the custom database you should definitely come close to the 58/42 possession and 81% pass completion numbers. If we analyze how and when Arsenal tends to shoot, we see that few long shots are attempted. Usually a team would have a 50/50 distribution between shots from outside and inside the box. In Arsenal's case it's a 62.2% distribution in favour of shots made from inside or close to the box. Last year this distribution was close to 70/30, so apparently the team has tried bringing some versatility to the shooting department in the 2010/2011 season. They still prefer to shoot closer to goal though. Here are some match-by-match shooting statistics: • Liverpool 1-1 Arsenal = 18 shots, 3 on target (16.6%) Learning from these shooting statistics, it's clear that Arsenal are lacking an option in midfield that can take some shots at goal if it's too crowded in the box. Someone like Essien/Lampard/Gerrard that will add one more dimension to the attacking play. This article was written based on the first 10 matches of the season. Every 10 matches I will collect new statistics and present them here, highlighting the differences from the last 10 games. This season was the first time Wenger has used the 4-2-3-1 formation as a base, so the tactic will change naturally as the season progress and the players learn and get comfortable with their new positions. Some players have made drastic changes to their positional behaviour, others have stayed almost exactly the same. In general, Arsenal has performed slightly below what they did in the first 10 matches, in which they had 20 points (out of 30), scored 22 goals and conceded 10. In matches 11-20, they earned 19 points, scored 20 goals and conceded 12. Clichy & Sagna (WBL & WBR) Clichy spends much less time in the opponents half, almost 13% less than in 1-10. Sagna also spent less time in the opponents half, but only by 6-7% in total. The biggest difference from the fist 10 matches is that Sagna spends double the amount of time in the DR slot now, indicating that he's been instructed not to be as high up the pitch. Djorou, Koscielny & Squillaci (DLC & DRC) The DLC slot has had a similar treatment, being pulled back slightly and better cover for the left wing back...but is by large pretty much the same as it was in the first 10 matches. Wilshere & Song (MLC & MRC) Song, on the other hand, has been doing the opposite - going forward more and playing wider than in the first 10 matches. But he has also stopped coming into Wilshere's MLC territory, showing that the pair have started to trust each other more. Song now spends more time covering his MRC position and the right hand sideline, instead of trying to help Wilshere out and venturing into the left side of midfield. Arshavin, Nasri & Walcott (AML & AMR) Instead, it's the AML slot that has changed quite a bit. Arshavin and Nasri has transformed the AML slot into a very free roaming position, covering lots of width. There is almost a 20% increase in passes made from the right hand side of the pitch, in comparison to the first 10 matches. Arshavin/Nasri have clearly been told that playing the AML slot means roaming all over the pitch, almost acting as a second AMC. The reason for this might be that Fabregas/AMC have been dropping deeper lately, so the AML slot might be compensating by covering the AMC position at times. Fabregas, Chamakh & Van Persie (AMC & FC) The FC slot is probably the biggest change from the first 10 matches. With Van Persie getting more games, he is making the overall position drop much deeper, and the FC actually spends almost half of his time in the AMC area. It's also even more obvious now that the FC and AMR positions do swap, as roughly 20% of the FC's passes come from the right flank. Average Positions Wilshere and Song have pivoted, making Song the more advanced midfielder of the two. The AML slot is the most drastic difference, probably because Nasri has been playing there, and his behaviour has influenced the average position. If it was only Arshavin, he would have the same average position as in match 1-10. Other Statistics Conclusion & Analysis The reduction in passing accuracy is probably because of the increase in amount of passes, indicating that the team has been trying more complicated passes, taking more chances in speculative distribution. If that is the case, a reduction in passing completion is only natural and nothing to worry to much about. However, as the team haven't improved, maybe they would be better off having the same cautious passing approach as in the first 10 matches of the season - they scored more, got more points and conceded less that way. The philosophy behind total football is to have a 100% fluid team. That's the simple explanation. The more detailed explanation is that in total football, every player is expected to make positional decisions on his own, roaming into attacking or defensive positions as he wish. However, in total football it's extremely important to keep the structure of the formation intact as well. So whenever a player decides to roam, another player has to fill that position to keep the structure intact. Otherwise there would just be 10 forwards on the pitch, and this actually happened at times with the 1974 Holland team (there are videos on Youtube showing the team starting attacks with 8 players lunging forward). Wenger has always been interested in total football, and has been using parts of the philosophy in all his tactics - most notably in the wide forward positions. Last year he experimented with a 'floating core', where almost half the team had license to roam, and the other half rigid. This year he has abandoned the floating/solid core idea and gone for another approach that is more vague. Fabregas is the most obvious example of a player with full roaming instructions. He comes deep to get balls, he goes wide, he often ends up in FC positions, etc. The connection to total football here is that Wilshere and Song both covers for Fabregas to keep the formation intact, so when Cesc comes deep to get the ball, one of the midfielders will push up to the AMC slot. This makes the midfield trio very fluid, and as evidenced by the season so far, both Song and Wilshere are frequently ending up in advanced positions. And when they do, you'll often find Cesc outside the penalty area, arriving from a deeper position. The midfield trio aren't the only players exercising this behaviour though. Theo Walcott has always said he regards himself as a striker, and this year Wenger has allowed him freedom to seek a central position throughout games. And to keep the structure intact, the FC (either Van Persie or Chamakh) fills that position. Those two examples happen lots of times, but the whole team are instructed to fill position and keep the structure if someone ventures forward. The latest example is when Clichy lunged forward in the Man City game - Arshavin immediately fell back to the DL slot. In FM we'll have to emulate this behaviour by swapping instructions. The new match engine actually is more intelligent - players WILL replace each other in extreme situations, but not as much as in reality of course. Finally it's time to fire up the game and start transferring what we learned from all those statistics and notes. The formation is pretty straightforward: Wing backs are pushed up a notch to emulate their real life behaviour of being very attacking. As previously mentioned, they are slightly different, but not enough to push Clichy back to a more traditional DL position. Central defenders are in traditional positions. The holding midfielders are also in traditional 4-2-3-1 positions (the formation called '4-2-3-1 Denmark' in the FM editor), and one might argue that Song should be placed in the absolute MC slot, as he does play very central...but placing him there created some negative behaviours in the match engine, so he's stuck in the MRC slot. Wide forwards start out from wide positions, but cut inside and usually occupy the AML/RC slots. I had some issues with getting the AMR slot to behave as intended for a while, and I even tried putting him in the AMRC slot instead...but I finally got him right, and the AMR slot is now acting correctly. It is essentially just a classic 4-2-3-1, with full backs pushed up to wing backs, and AML/R's instead of AML/RC's. I don't really know why a standard 4-2-3-1 in FM has AML/RC's instead of AML/R's, usually when teams play a 4-2-3-1 they use wide/inverted wingers. Here's just an explanation of the general team instructions. For individual instructions questions, check the tactic in-game and post a question in the commentary section at the bottom of this page. Starting from the top: very fluid philosophy, as all players are expected to perform both attacking and defensive duties. Control as a starting strategy, as that's what possession football is all about: control. Passing is shorter, as Arsenal play a short passing game. Creative freedom had to be pulled down to default, as the higher setting just made all players ignore much of the tactical instructions. Arsenal plays a pretty good pressing game this year, so closing down is set to 'press more'. Tackling is just default, or 'normal'. Marking is always zonal, Wenger has always said that he don't believe in man marking anyone, even though Song clearly did man mark Messi at The Emirates. Crossing is set to drill, mostly because the floating ones are too floating. It didn't look realistic. Roaming is set to more - the whole team roams around constantly throughout matches. Defensive line was higher last year, but fairly normal now. The introduction of more 'traditional' centre backs like Koscielny and Squillaci has naturally pulled down the defensive line slightly, and gives it more stability. Even though Arsenal play pretty wide at times, I struggled with getting a realistic experience in the 3D match engine with a wide instruction....so I narrowed it down and now it looks much better. Some might argue that since Arsenal are playing a probing passing game, they should be set to a pretty slow passing tempo, but they do in fact pass the ball around quickly. Watching Arsenal games shows you that they rarely dwell on the ball, but rather try to move it around the team swiftly and probingly at the same time. Focus passing was set to through the middle in the first versions of the tactic, but the ball possession percentage took a big hit, so it's now mixed. No counter attack and no offside trap. The team do counter attack many times in real life, but counter attack in FM terms means lots of long balls to lone strikers, which isn't really Arsenal. As with every tactic in the world, there are positives and negatives, and I'm fairly sure I've captured the most important traits of both: • The possession is there - the team passes the ball around quickly but probingly, and it looks convincing in the match engine, at least as far as the match engine allows. • All the set pieces are constructed exactly as in real life, so it's the correct players in the correct positions. • The formation is fluid and switches between 4-2-3-1, 4-3-3 and 4-2-4, just like the real tactic. • The defence struggles for the same reason as real life - central defenders get caught out of position when trying to close down the opposition too high up the pitch, and there is lots of space for the opposition on the flanks, due to the attacking nature of Arsenal's wing backs. • The attack also struggles for the same real life reasons - the team only tries for goal if they are close enough, and the probing passing play often translates into the final third of the pitch, creating that 'pass into goal' behaviour. Some things were impossible to do, like the width of the central defenders (they play very wide when Arsenal is in possession), the interaction between Song and the defensive line, etc...but overall I must say that this tactic will get you as close as possible to the real Arsenal 4-2-3-1. Limitations Of The Game In FM2010 there was an issue with letting central defenders burst forward, as Arsenal's defenders did during last season. Luckily for us, they don't do this anymore, at least not as frequent as before, so this won't be a major issue. There are also some limitations when it comes to positioning - I'd like to place some players in between the pre-determined positions, and at times FM can feel restricted in this area. I'd like for Song to drop down to a third central defender when Vermaelen or Koscielny are out wide covering for the full backs, but so far I haven't been able to create this behaviour. But the biggest limitation is the one dealing with positional fluidity. The current match engine can't cope well with fully free roles, which is a key feature of the real 4-2-3-1. Finally, the best evidence of the tactic emulating real life behaviour is to compare match stats side by side. Keep in mind that the real chalkboards draw a dot to the receiver as well as the distributor, so some of the real chalkboards will seem 'wider' than the in-game ones. Hover over the images to switch between in-game analysis/real life analysis. The most obvious problems are getting the midfield trio to play as wide as they do in real life, and to get the FC to occupy the flanks as frequently as he should, but it's as close as it's going to get. Example A: Base formation, a 4-2-3-1 with the two midfielders dropping down to DM's even though their starting positions are MC's. Example B: Both MC's are dropping very low and become DM's, all while the attack line are shaping themselves into a 4-2-1-3, running into positions from a long pass forward. Example C: Shows the midfield pivot, having moved from a 2-1 to almost a 1-2 with Song coming deep to collect a pass. In this case Fabregas has dropped down, and Wilshere has filled his position, keeping the structure of the formation intact. Example D: Once again showing the defensive nature of Song, as he comes very deep in comparison to the rest of the midfield. In this screenshot the midfield pivot has fully transformed into a 1-2. Example E: In this example, the formation has fluidly become a 4-1-2-3 in an attacking move. Example F: Chamakh is not in view, but he has replaced Walcott on the right as Walcott has ventured into a central position, just as in real life. Here the formation has become a 4-2-1-3, with Fabregas coming deep to dictate play, while Wilshere has filled his position to keep the structure intact. • I can't score, what am I doing wrong? • I'm conceding lots of goals, what am I doing wrong? • I'm losing/can't keep possession/let in late goals, what's wrong? And the final one, my favourite: lower ALL players' creative freedom to zero. This will make them stick more to the gameplan, which can be absolutely vital in some games. I usually do this if I notice that our pass completion is bad (below 77-78%), or if it's just not "working" on the pitch. • I don't know what kind of players I should sign? Rene Adler (GK), Mark Schwarzer (GK), Debuchy (DR), Van Der Wiel (DR), Etienne Capoue (DM), Moussa Sissoko (DM), N'Zonzi (DM), Eden Hazard (AM), etc... • Do I need the database/what is it for? • Why is AMR set to swap with the FC? I just have to mention a couple of things. Last tactic I made received an awesome response from the FM community, and I'm very thankful for all the positive comments I've received. This time I've tried to put in ten times the effort, and I hope it shows. Personally, I think this article is light years above the old one, and I'm very happy with the result. Also, I'd like to thank Joss (@JossBennett), who helped me out more than he thinks he did. It was completely priceless having someone to look through the work, test the tactic and receive feedback from. And having such a person to bounce ideas with made me work harder as well. We've had plenty of discussions on Twitter during the last month, so thanks Joss for all your input! Arsenal 4-2-3-1 | v1.02 Either click directly on the links, or right-click and choose 'Save As...' Instructions: the tactic is put into User/Documents/Sports Interactive/Football Manager 2011/tactics, and the database is put into User/Documents/Sports Interactive/Football Manager 2011/editor data - you apply it by starting a new game and choosing it in the database dialogue.
• Liverpool 1-1 Arsenal = 511 passes in total, 88% pass completion, 64% possession
• Arsenal 6-0 Blackpool = 554 passes in total, 89% pass completion, 54% possession
• Blackburn 1-2 Arsenal = 458 passes in total, 84% pass completion, 65% possession
• Arsenal 4-1 Bolton = 523 passes in total, 89% pass completion, 65% possession
• Sunderland 1-1 Arsenal = 305 passes in total, 84% pass completion, 46% possession
• Arsenal 2-3 West Bromwich Albion = 545 passes in total, 83% pass completion, 65% possession
• Chelsea 2-0 Arsenal = 398 passes in total, 86% pass completion, 53% possession
• Arsenal 2-1 Birmingham = 534 passes in total, 88% pass completion, 58% possession
• Man City 0-3 Arsenal = 612 passes in total, 90% pass completion, 65% possession
• Arsenal 1-0 West Ham = 501 passes in total, 87% pass completion, 66% possession
• Arsenal 0-1 Newcastle = 589 passes in total, 79% pass completion, 57% possession
• Wolves 0-2 Arsenal = 502 passes in total, 70% pass completion, 48% possession
• Everton 1-2 Arsenal = 495 passes in total, 77% pass completion, 51% possession
• Arsenal 2-3 Tottenham = 564 passes in total, 78% pass completion, 61% possession
• Aston Villa 2-4 Arsenal = 650 passes in total, 81% pass completion, 60% possession
• Arsenal 2-1 Fulham = 558 passes in total, 75% pass completion, 55% possession
• Man Utd 1-0 Arsenal = 563 passes in total, 74% pass completion, 54% possession
• Arsenal 3-1 Chelsea = 579 passes in total, 83% pass completion, 55% possession
• Wigan 2-2 Arsenal = 651 passes in total, 84% pass completion, 61% possession
• Birmingham 0-3 Arsenal = 463 passes in total, 76% pass completion, 50% possession
Passing The Ball Into The Net
• Arsenal 6-0 Blackpool = 30 shots, 6 on target (20%)
• Blackburn 1-2 Arsenal = 14 shots, 2 on target (14.2%)
• Arsenal 4-1 Bolton = 21 shots, 6 on target (28.5%)
• Sunderland 1-1 Arsenal = 17 shots, 3 on target (17.6%)
• Arsenal 2-3 West Bromwich Albion = 28 shots, 4 on target (14.2%)
• Chelsea 2-0 Arsenal = 16 shots, 4 on target (25%)
• Arsenal 2-1 Birmingham = 20 shots, 6 on target (30%)
• Man City 0-3 Arsenal = 15 shots, 4 on target (26.6%)
• Arsenal 1-0 West Ham = 23 shots, 9 on target (39.1%)
• Arsenal 0-1 Newcastle = 14 shots, 3 on target (21.4%)
• Wolves 0-2 Arsenal = 14 shots, 2 on target (14.2%)
• Everton 1-2 Arsenal = 13 shots, 3 on target (23%)
• Arsenal 2-3 Tottenham = 15 shots, 2 on target (13.3%)
• Aston Villa 2-4 Arsenal = 20 shots, 3 on target (15%)
• Arsenal 2-1 Fulham = 16 shots, 5 on target (31.2%)
• Man Utd 1-0 Arsenal = 11 shots, 4 on target (36.3%)
• Arsenal 3-1 Chelsea = 10 shots, 3 on target (30%)
• Wigan 2-2 Arsenal = 17 shots, 4 on target (23.5%)
• Birmingham 0-3 Arsenal = 20 shots, 9 on target (45%)
Halfway Season Update!
Both wing backs have been more reserved in comparison to the first 10 matches, dropping deeper to try and add more defensive stability. Which clearly hasn't worked, as the team has conceded more goals (2) in match 11-20.
The DRC slot, most often occupied by Squillaci during match 11-20, has been pulled back a little, and made slightly wider - probably an instruction to cover better for Sagna when he goes forward. Overall the DRC slot is fairly similar to how it was in the first 10 matches.
Wilshere is showing better positional discipline by narrowing his field and dropping slightly deeper to add more stability to the defensive side of things. He spends almost 12% less time in the AMC line, and 7% more in his starting MLC position.
The AMR slot has such small differences from the first 10 matches that it's basically still the exact same position and instructions that go with it.
The AMC slot has been pulled back slightly, not as advanced as it was in the first 10 matches. Personally I think that the reason for this is that Fabregas has been injured/out of form, so the natural behaviour is to play it 'safe' by dropping a little deeper. However, it's just a 3.8% decrease in time spent in the AMC line, so it's not a massive difference in the offensive side. Instead, the biggest difference is that the position has been better centered, as the right flank is occupied by Sagna and Walcott/Nasri at a better standard than in the first 10 matches.
Every single position except the MRC has been pulled back in comparison to matches 1-10. This could explain why the amount of goals (both scored and conceded) has been worse in matches 11-20. It's also a natural progression as players settle more into their positions. The average positions of matches 1-10 are faded in so you can compare:
The biggest difference between the first and the last 10 matches, is that Arsenal's passing completion average has dropped by almost 10%, from 86.8% down to 78.7%. Their average possession has also dropped, from 60% to 55.2%. The amount of passes have increased though, from 494 passes per game to 561 passes per game.
The fact that the whole team has been pulled back is interesting, and probably a big part of the reason as to why Arsenal has performed slightly below what they did in matches 1-10. And even though Arsenal only conceded and scored 2 more goals both ways, those 4 goals scored/conceded in total could have given Arsenal 6 more points, which would put them on 45 points instead of 39.Connections to Total Football
Using in FM: Formation
Using in FM: Team Instructions
Final Result: How close did we get?
Obviously there are limitations in trying to emulate reality through a game. Some behaviours just won't be possible to reproduce, due to database, match engine or just game functionality limitations.Final Result: Player Stats Comparisons
Screenshot Examples
Frequently Asked Questions
You have to give the team some time to become fluid with the formation, and if you're struggling for goals I would suggest playing the FC and AMR/L's that are in the best form and have the best morale. When the team have momentum you can go back to the normal first choice players.
Unfortunately this is true in reality as well. Arsenal have had instability at the back since the iron curtain of Seaman-Winterburn-Keown-Adams-Dixon was dissolved. And just as in reality you will concede goals, especially since the goalkeepers at the club just aren't good enough for top flight football at the moment. However, the current backline will become very good, so buying a good goalkeeper in the January transfer window could help you concede less.
There are a couple of tricks I do frequently to alter a match without messing with the core tactic. First one is pulling the wing backs down to full back positions, without altering anything else. This makes the tactic slightly more stable, and is a good trick if you want to protect a lead. Another trick is to raise tackling to hard - a good approach in hard away games.
In the upcoming Arsenal Simulation Compendium Deux, there will be a whole section dedicated to transfer suggestions, with realism scores and so on. But in the meantime, here are a couple of somewhat realistic suggestions;
You don't need the database, but without it you won't get realistic results when it comes to possession and pass completion. The database also has changing home/away/third kits every year, altered attributes, improved player looks, correct competition names, etc.
Both Theo and Nasri does this in real life when playing in that AMR position, especially Theo. Many times during games he drifts in towards the FC position, and the FC comes out to cover and keep the structure intact. Read more about the philosophy behind the swap instructions in the 'Connections to Total Football' section in the article above.Final Words
Downloads
DS2 Database | v1.00